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Political Leadership in the Transformation of Societies:
F. W. de Klerk and Pim Fortuyn in the Multicultural Project
Helinna Ayalew

If you fail to honor your people,
They will fail to honor you;
It is said of a good leader that
When the work is done, the aim fulfilled,
The people will say, ‗We did this ourselves.‘1
Lao Tzu, 604–531 B. C., Founder of Taoism, Tao Te Ching
I.

Introduction

The importance of leadership has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout history.
Countless examples of extraordinary leaders, ranging from Mahatma Gandhi to Vladimir
Lenin and Mao Tse-tung to Barack Obama, remind us of the effect one or a small group
of political leaders can have on a society. These great historical figures are
transformational leaders because they were able to spearhead fundamental change within
their societies.
While the inspirational and forward moving variant of leadership is well documented, it
has also been known to go awry. Leadership positions have been abused by many
leaders—what James McGregor Burns would characterize as ―power-holders‖—in
countries throughout the world. This study is an endeavor to understand what goes into
the creation of a successful leader, and how those characteristics can be implemented in
political leadership today. It is an attempt to demystify the sometimes perplexing leaderfollower relationship.
Globalization has brought with it many new challenges and opportunities for societies
all around the world. Leaders have had to react to these new developments; their
reactions in turn affect the lives of people both within their societies and around the
world. These challenges and opportunities vary according to context, yet there are certain
threads of similarity. One phenomenon that most societies have had to deal with, albeit to
varying degrees, is the creation and/or sustenance of multicultural societies.
This essay examines the way in which leaders in the Netherlands and South Africa have
responded to forced societal change brought about by global economic, social, and/or
political pressures. It then questions how these leaders contributed to the multicultural
project within their respective societies. The case studies will look at two
transformational political leaders: F. W. de Klerk in South Africa and Pim Fortuyn in the
Netherlands.2
These leaders were selected for several reasons. First, under their influence, tangible
change occurred within their respective societies, be it legislatively or within popular
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discourse. Second, both of these leaders are highly controversial figures. Although de
Klerk was heavily involved in the negotiations for the new South Africa and was awarded
a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, several different factors have led to a divided
perception of him in the South African collective memory.3 Fortuyn, on the other hand,
was central to a major swing in public discourse regarding immigration, tolerance, and
―political correctness‖ in the Netherlands. He provided a voice that was previously taboo
in the country, which has proven to have both positive and negative outcomes.
This analysis begins with a presentation of the definitions and broad theoretical
framework in which it is situated. It will then delve into the case studies, looking at the
societal contexts in which both leaders were operating, personal characteristics of these
men, and a discussion of their overall contributions in building a multicultural society. It
will provide a comparative analysis of both societies and their leaders. Finally, the
conclusion will reflect upon implications of these findings for leadership studies and
globalization, and contribute suggestions for further research.
II.

Multiculturalism and Leadership: A Theoretical Framework

Multiculturalism is defined here as a theory of societal organization made up of
individuals and communities from different backgrounds—such as religion, race, or any
other form of social distinction—in which people live side by side harmoniously in a
cosmopolitan spirit of respect and mutual growth. The multicultural project, therefore, is
the constant endeavor to create this spirit and society.
One of the first attempts to define transformational political leadership was offered by
James Burns, who put forth the now famous distinction between transformational and
transactional leadership. Transactional leaders, sometimes referred to today as managers,
are those that implement what they are assigned. They operate within the status quo and
generally do not attempt to alter it. Alternatively, Burns describes transformational
leadership as occurring when ―leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of
motivation and morality.‖4 He places a strong emphasis on morality and higher order
values, which will fundamentally transform both the leader and the followers. An
example of this type of leader is Mahatma Gandhi.
This theory is extended by Bernard M. Bass, who proposes that, ―transformational
leaders motivate their followers to commit to and to realize performance outcomes that
exceed their expectations.‖5 Unlike Burns, however, Bass sees transformational
leadership as amoral and universally applicable.6 He postulates that transformational
leaders use their authority and power to fundamentally reshape, via coercive means, the
social and physical environment, thereby destroying the old way of life and making way
for a new one.
The dimensionality of charisma in leadership has been highly contested. Max Weber
identified three cycles of ―pure‖ leadership that all societies must undergo: the
charismatic, the rational-legal, and the traditional.7 He characterizes charismatic leaders
as those distinguished from ordinary people by their heroic and seemingly superhuman
qualities. Since Weber, subsequent attempts to study charismatic leadership have resulted
in considerable variation. For some scholars, charismatic leadership should be examined
as a phenomenon separate from transformational leadership.8 Others take it as a
component of transformational leadership,9 or consider them as one and the same.10
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Different authors have treated charisma as a personality trait of the leader, an attribution
bestowed upon the leader by the followers, or a combination of the two. Nevertheless, in
the debate regarding charisma and leadership, there is a consensus that the relationship
between leader and follower is crucial.
I will agree with Conger and Kanungo in the understanding of charismatic leadership as
a form of transformational leadership; indeed, it is the most exemplary form that
transformational leaders can assume.11 Not all transformational leaders are charismatic,
but a charismatic leader is de facto a transformational leader. To place the distinction in
more concrete terms, I will briefly utilize the contemporary case of the campaign of the
44th President of the United States, Barack Obama, as an example.
For the purposes of this study, transformational political leadership is defined as any
leadership that brings about fundamental change in the political, economic, or social
institutions of a polity. It is an amoral force that is utilized for the purpose of a
fundamental alteration of the existing status quo. Transformational leaders emphasize
higher goals development, and arouse their followers‘ motivations by means of creating
and representing an inspiring vision of the future.12 In other words, the emphasis is placed
on the idealized vision and ultimate attainment of a specified goal. In the case of
President Obama‘s campaign, his message was clear from the slogan ―Change We Can
Believe In.‖ His consistent reiteration of the message of change is an example of how
leaders articulate a radical message. By attaining the goal (which he clearly stated in one
line at his victory speech: ―Change has come to America‖) he became a transformational
leader.13
Charismatic leadership, however, is essentially defined in terms of the followers. It is a
form of transformational leadership in which followers view their leader as extraordinary
and capable of bringing about fundamental change. This form of leadership is also about
the articulation and implementation of some higher order goal, but it is more leadercentered. Followers identify with the cause because of the personal characteristics they
have attributed to the leader. As Ann Ruth Willner puts it, ―It is not what the leader is but
what people see the leader as that counts in generating the charismatic relationship.‖14
Conger identifies two important factors of this attribution: leaders taking personal risks
and exhibiting unconventional behavior.15 Returning to our example, Obama is a
charismatic leader because his followers identified the movement with him personally.
They saw him as extraordinary, taking personal risks, and exhibiting unconventional
behavior.16 The following sections will examine the two case studies for this project in
detail. The nuances between the charismatic and the transformational leader will be
further articulated.
III.

Case Studies

A. Apartheid’s Last Ringmaster: F. W. de Klerk
From the beginning, F. W. de Klerk seemed destined to enter a life of politics. He was
raised in a political family, with his father being a long-standing parliamentarian and his
uncle having served as Prime Minister of South Africa. In his autobiography, The Last
Trek: A New Beginning, he recounts being interested in politics and public affairs from a
young age. His upbringing was also strongly rooted in the Dutch Reformed Church and
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steeped in conservative religious morality.17 Like many of his Afrikaner schoolmates, in
his youth he was highly supportive of Dr. Verwoerd‘s creation of the independent
―Bantustans.‖18
From his initial appointment to Parliament in 1972, he quickly rose in rank to
eventually take a ministerial position. He served in numerous portfolios, including
mineral and energy affairs (which exposed him to the issues of labor conditions within
the mines) and as Minister of Home Affairs from 1982–1985.19 He explains how his
experiences, particularly in the latter post, began to chip away at his previously held
assumptions on the validity of the Bantustan system.
Throughout his rise up the political ladder de Klerk acquired the reputation of being
situated in the conservative camp. He refutes this claim in his autobiography, stating that
he would often challenge plans at reform that were too hastily proposed, taking on the
role of devil‘s advocate. As he puts it, it was his drive for rationalization that had him
labeled as a spoiler of reform and garnered him the conservative (or verkramptes) label.20
A major part of this perception was his strong support of the concept of ―Own Affairs,‖
which was the idea that each racial group should be responsible for their designated
―own‖ activities.21
In 1989, having served as leader of the National Party (NP) for almost two years, de
Klerk took the office of state president after Botha had been forced out of office due to a
stroke. Upon becoming president, de Klerk faced a host of problems. The infrastructure
of apartheid was crumbling. The country had been under a state of emergency for several
years, and the strength of the African National Congress‘s (ANC) support base was
undeniable. The economy was in a fast decline; the political instability in the country had
resulted in much capital flight, and normal business activity was being disrupted. Global
pressures were also bearing down from outside the country. Economic sanctions and
consumer activism were forcing the economy and the political sphere into a crisis.
Although South Africa was in fast decline, the country was not on the cusp of abject
failure. The state still retained a strong security infrastructure, either through covert or
conventional means. The various ―securocrats‖ were a powerful and ominous presence.22
De Klerk came into office in September 1989 with the determination to launch a
democratic transformation process because, he claims, of the necessity of action on the
government‘s part and also personal conviction.23 In the first few months of his
presidency, he worked to normalize the security forces, lifted the ban on peaceful public
protest, and began the systematic release of some high profile political prisoners. An
important development was that the beginning of de Klerk‘s presidency coincided with
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. The communist threat in southern
Africa, specifically the Soviet Union‘s influence on the ANC and the South African
Communist Party, had all but disappeared, allowing space for a more adventurous
approach.
Undoubtedly the most important moment of de Klerk‘s political career came on
February 2, 1990, when, in dramatic fashion, de Klerk delivered a speech at the opening
of Parliament ―unbanning‖ the ANC and thirty-one other organizations, as well as
announcing the unconditional release of famed political prisoner Nelson Mandela.24 This
speech set in motion a process of transferring power to majority vote on the principle of
―one-man, one-vote,‖ which brought Mandela to power in 1994.
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The actual negotiations were a long and arduous process, consuming nearly four years,
with both sides making considerable concessions to meet in the middle. The biggest
challenge for both de Klerk and Mandela was maintaining a strong center while
controlling the violent factions on both sides.25
When examining de Klerk‘s style of leadership during the transition, he can be
categorized as transformational but not charismatic. He was certainly instrumental in
bringing about the fundamental change that occurred in South Africa, and is usually
acknowledged as an important figure in the nation‘s history, but he has at no point in time
been granted the attribute of charismatic leader. There are at least three important reasons
for this eventuality. First is the ambiguity of the circumstances surrounding his decision
to begin the entire process heralded by his speech to Parliament. Alex Callinicos suggests
three possible reasons why de Klerk undertook the project. Firstly, there were the
objective constraints on the regime. The most important of these was South Africa‘s
international political impasse and the deteriorating economic conditions within the
country. Secondly, and the one most stressed by de Klerk and his fellow party members,
was a change of mind about the validity of the system. To put it succinctly, ―they had
ceased to believe that apartheid was morally defensible.‖26 The third element in his
decision was de Klerk‘s ―ruthless strategic calculation.‖ As Ronald Aronson puts it, ―de
Klerk‘s brilliant maneuver was to release Mandela, unban the ANC, begin the
negotiations, and move to end apartheid before he was forced to.‖27 By putting himself
one step ahead of an obviously sinking ship, he ensured his instrumental position in the
creation of the new order and, perhaps unintentionally, secured himself a spot on the
―right side of history.‖
The second reason why de Klerk cannot be characterized as a charismatic leader was
the impression he left on the South African public during the negotiations and in the
Government of National Unity (GNU), with the ultimate culmination of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Though both de Klerk and Mandela were committed
to reaching a negotiated settlement, certain propositions on the part of the NP, such as the
notion of ―group rights,‖ prompted the image of a party desperately trying to hold on to
some vestige of the old ways.28
Third, de Klerk was not endearing personality-wise, particularly when compared to the
nation‘s hero, Nelson Mandela. He was certainly intelligent, rational, and a good listener,
however none of these attributes contribute to a charismatic public persona. He has been
described as ―bland‖ by journalists in South Africa.29 No matter how the party tried to reestablish itself by opening up membership to all races and other such reforms, the fact
remained that this was still the same National Party that was synonymous with apartheid
in the eyes of most South Africans. De Klerk represented the old order, the government
that had conceded defeat to the ANC. Mandela, on the other hand, was the survivor
against all odds, the man who spent over a quarter century of his life behind bars for the
purpose of achieving freedom for all South Africans.
Shifting attention away from public perceptions of de Klerk and his leadership, how
should one weigh his involvement in the transformation of his society in terms of
building ―the new South Africa‖ as a stronger, more multicultural society? From the
beginning, de Klerk had been gravely concerned about the protection of Afrikaner rights
in an all-inclusive democracy. A central concern of the Afrikaner community was the
country‘s economic conditions, but even more important was anxiety for cultural identity
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and personal security.30 Yet de Klerk is frequently accused by many Afrikaners of not
having upheld the promises of his initial referendum and that he granted too many
concessions during the negotiations.31
A crucial part of locating de Klerk in the political history of South Africa came during
the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The TRC was an important
endeavor in the reinvention of the nation. De Klerk‘s testimony was underwhelming in
the eyes of the majority. He took no personal blame for any wrongdoing, attributing the
atrocities instead to rogue elements in the government. Conger and Kanungo identify
unconventional behavior as a character trait of charismatic leaders. This includes
exemplary acts of heroism involving personal risks and self-sacrifice.32 At the TRC, de
Klerk conveyed none of these elements. He responded predictably and the public,
particularly the black population, was not favorable to his sentiments.
Context is also important in understanding de Klerk‘s role as a leader. In a recent
interview, he claimed that the 1980s were a time of self-analysis within the National
Party: ―When I became leader, it was my privilege to say, ‗We have this new vision, what
we must now do is to implement it.‘‖33 If indeed the National Party and the Afrikaner
elite had come to the gradual realization that apartheid was a morally reprehensible and
pragmatically unsustainable system, then de Klerk‘s personal role seems to be
diminished. Coupled with the considerable pressure placed upon the regime from both
internal and external sources, his detractors have argued that de Klerk was merely a
leader in transformational times—that the actions taken by the government were forced
upon them and that their moral about-face conveniently coincided with this development.
Yet, he did undertake a considerable amount of initiative, which was not always popular
with his constituency. As a study conducted in 1992 illustrates, the Afrikaner community
was not ready to accept the changes brought by de Klerk‘s government.34 His February 2,
1990, speech and his continued commitment to reach a negotiated settlement did require
a considerable amount of political courage. De Klerk‘s government could have taken the
despotic route and continued on with the mass suppression that marked his predecessor.
The infrastructure to do so was certainly in place. Instead, he took the path of reform and
negotiated himself out of power, thereby laying the groundwork for the future democratic
South Africa. Whether one takes the position of critic or admirer is a matter of
interpretation, but none can dispute that under his watch, South Africa turned the
historical corner and entered into a new era.
B. Pim Fortuyn: Dutch Political Dandy
By 2001, the Netherlands had a widely admired international reputation as being among
the most tolerant and outward-oriented countries in the world. Politically, the country is
notable for its historical ―Pillarization‖ model, which necessitated a culture of consensus
politics. The self-segregation of different ―pillars‖ based on religious and ideological
differences within the society meant that there was no majority, forcing the government
to operate on a consensus basis. In everyday society as well, the Dutch were accustomed
to living within their own separate but parallel pillars. Due to the increased secularization
of society, by the late 1960s the system had collapsed.35 Politically, however, the legacy
of the pillarized system remained largely intact within the established parties, with the
country‘s historic ―Purple Coalition‖ created in 1994.36

6

It was into this political setting that Pim Fortuyn was to make his sensational
appearance in 2001. His time in Dutch politics lasted hardly a year (dating from mid2001 to his assassination on May 6, 2002), yet within that period he acquired a massive
following throughout the country and political victory in his hometown of Rotterdam. He
shocked the established parties and Dutch society as a whole with a message and political
personality new to the Netherlands. He was a populist who played on the fears of the less
educated lower and middle classes. Whether one agreed with him or not, his flamboyant
dress and lifestyle, coupled with his confrontational manner of debate, rarely failed to
captivate anyone watching.
Fortuyn did not, however, come into this role overnight. He began his catapult into
Dutch public life as a sociologist and lecturer at the University of Groningen, where he
was (like many at this time) an advocate of Marxist socialist philosophy. Fortuyn never
fit comfortably into academic life, however, and moved on for a stint in the business
world. His brash mannerism and insistence on doing things his own way made it difficult
for him to find employment, and he subsequently spent several years without any
permanent position. He earned a living writing freelance and taking public speaking
engagements. According to political ally and friend Marco Pastors, this was when many
of his opinions on issues were formed. Fortuyn came into contact with people all over the
Netherlands and spent much time debating and listening to the concerns of ―the everyday
Dutch person.‖37 This would later provide him a competitive edge in his political career.
His emergence from outside of politics and his ability to relate to those people who felt
their concerns had been brushed under the rug were a huge part of his attraction. His
ideas were different from anything previously expressed in Dutch public life. In a country
where cultural sensitivities were acute after World War II, the dramatic statements he
made about Islam and integration were shocking to the average Dutch citizen.
Fortuyn was deliberate in his choice of timing to enter formal politics. Economically,
the country was doing well, which made his sudden popularity puzzling for most
observers. Yet Fortuyn ran on a platform of issues the established parties mostly skirted:
criminality, unemployment, and the integration of minorities. All of those issues were
deemed politically incorrect.38 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, no doubt were
an important part of it. Suddenly cultural differences seemed ominous enough to trump
all else. Fortuyn vocalized the inner concerns and hesitations of a large part of the
population.39
Fortuyn‘s challenge to and critique of the Dutch political establishment and discourse
place him squarely within the realm of transformational leadership. Like many populist
politicians, he had a passionate following among the lower and middle classes, but he
also attracted a group of nouveau riche around him as well, who were seeking social
recognition by being associated with the radical leader.40 The passion and devotion to
―Fortuynism‖ were also witnessed after his murder, which saw an outpouring of emotion
on the part of the Dutch public, both from his supporters and otherwise.41 Though there is
no doubt that Fortuyn sent shockwaves through Dutch society with his message, his
murder, as the first political assassination since 1672, gained an even more important
position in the popular memory. He was now a martyr of freedom of speech and the war
against ―political correctness,‖ punished for saying what he believed.42 Although the
statement that Holland ―lost its innocence‖ with the murder of Fortuyn may be an
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exaggeration, it certainly alerted Dutch citizens to the problems that existed within their
society.43
Whether one agrees with his opinions or not, it is indisputable that Fortuyn served
Dutch society by broadening the political spectrum in terms of what could and could not
be said. As Dick Pels put it, Dutch political discourse was never allowed to go beyond a
certain point towards the right. Fortuyn shattered that barrier, in the process shocking all
and offending many. What made Fortuyn distinct was that he did not care about respect
in the language he used. He had a point to make and he was going to make it, regardless
of what people thought or whom he upset along the way. He opened up the space for
debate by defying the rules of polite politics, and he gave a large segment of society
something they could actually relate to in politics—a person who had his faults and who
had an opinion.
Fortuyn was the first to put forth the image of a ―fatherless society.‖ The Dutch had lost
their way and needed to return to the father‘s house.44 This brought about an increased
sentiment of Dutch nationalism, or national communitarianism, based on liberal
Enlightenment values.45 Fortuyn also introduced to the established political parties and
the Dutch public a new type of politician that offered a ―personalized politics.‖46 He
showed that to be successful in politics one need not adhere to the traditional means
practiced thus far in the Netherlands. His skillful and entertaining debate style, coupled
with his flamboyant lifestyle and persona, turned him into a celebrity, creating a
distinctly Pim Fortuyn ―brand.‖ He was on television nearly every night, with guaranteed
high ratings for whichever station had him appear. It seemed the public simply could not
get enough of Pim.
Considering his effect on the multicultural society, Fortuyn and his movement are
central to the present day debate taking place on this topic in the Netherlands.47 The first
thing he did was challenge the government by claiming that what had previously been
accepted as ―right‖ was ―wrong.‖ Jeroen DeWulf explains that, ―He equated more
multiculturalism with a steadily less progressive society, whereas before multiculturalism
was viewed as part of Dutch progressiveness.‖48 Fortuyn warned about the ―Islamization‖
of Dutch culture, labeling Islam a ―backward‖ religion, and those that adhere strictly to it
as a threat to modern Western societies. Since Fortuyn, this idea seems to have slowly
permeated Dutch political culture, with politicians such as Geert Wilders regularly
making derogatory statements against Islam. Even those people inclined toward the
political center have become more attentive to ―cultural differences‖ that deem Islam and
Western society irreconcilable.49
Pim Fortuyn was the first contemporary public figure to challenge the status quo, but
several have followed, including Wilders and Theo Van Gogh.50 On the immigration and
integration front, however, there is a notable difference between Fortuyn and his most
important political successor, Wilders. While Fortuyn supported tightening controls on
immigration to the Netherlands, he also placed equal emphasis on better integrating the
already present populations, even calling for a general amnesty for those already in the
country.51 Fortuyn wanted to invest more money in schools and social infrastructure for
immigrants, demanding that they make an effort to integrate in return. In contrast,
Wilders‘ party proposes spending on deportation back to the countries of origin.52
At the time when Fortuyn entered the public eye and began to gain fame and notoriety,
the ―question of Islam‖ was mostly confined to the white Dutch population.53 Since then,
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however, and particularly after the dramatic events surrounding Theo van Gogh‘s
murder, minority communities are becoming more and more politicized. In the right
environment, this can create an opportunity for fruitful debate. Fortuyn contributed to a
new openness in democratic debate by providing an entirely new space into which
discourse could venture.
As for the political legacy Fortuyn left behind, he fundamentally questioned the
boundaries of freedom of speech in the Netherlands. Some would argue that he brought
the Dutch to the realization that this freedom was not really valid, as saying what you
believed would ultimately get you punished (murdered like Fortuyn and van Gogh, sued
like Wilders).54 What is clear is that he forced people to question their own political
preconceptions of what freedom of speech and respect for minorities meant for them, and
ultimately what it meant to be Dutch. He was first in beginning to re-essentialize Dutch
identity, thereby excluding all those that did not fit into his categorization.55 Fortuyn‘s
presence fundamentally altered public discourse. His ideas are no longer peripheral but
squarely situated in the everyday consciousness of Dutch society. He is not likely to be
forgotten any time soon.
IV.

Comparative Leadership

Comparing F. W. de Klerk and Pim Fortuyn, there are a few stark contrasts between the
two styles of leadership. The first, and most apparent, is their personalities. De Klerk is
usually soft-spoken and deliberative, and he presents himself in a rather composed
manner. He was never a crowd pleaser like Mandela, who took to singing songs and
leading chants with his supporters. From the time of his announcement of Mandela‘s
release and the onset of the negotiations, he was constantly compared to—and always
outshined by—this great figure. Despite his best attempts, de Klerk was never able to
fully disassociate himself from the legacy of the old regime. No doubt his race had much
to do with it; the country was just emerging from a long and painful period of white rule.
Black South Africans would not be quick to embrace a white man as hero of the country.
Yet de Klerk‘s political opposition to the ANC and his unwillingness to completely
denounce apartheid also kept him in that unfavorable light. Watching Fortuyn, on the
other hand, was like its own form of entertainment. His manner of dress, his lifestyle, and
the way in which he always made his debate opponents seem stuffy and old-fashioned
drew in the viewing public. Even if you did not agree with what he was saying, it was
difficult to ignore this distinctly ―Fortuyn brand.‖
The second point of comparison is the context in which the two leaders found
themselves. As the academic literature on leadership suggests, context can be an
important element in the rise of transformational leaders. In and of itself, the existence of
a crisis is ―neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause.‖56 However, crisis situations are
conducive to the rise of transformational leadership. De Klerk emerged as a leader at a
time when South Africa was in deep conflict. Years of suppression of the majority had
led to an unstable system, and a solution to the problem was ultimately unavoidable.
Fortuyn is a good example of a transformational leader who rose to power in a time of
little to no perceived crisis. Economically, the Netherlands was doing relatively well.
Significant minority communities had been present in the country since the time of the
guest worker system in the 1970s, and Dutch policy and discourse were always in line

9

with the celebrated value of Dutch tolerance. Fortuyn concerned himself with the issues
that were ―politically incorrect.‖ In doing so, he effectively created a crisis in the minds
of the Dutch public. He identified a problem and was able to convince people that it was
an urgent issue that needed to be addressed.
In terms of context, then, the central difference between the two leaders is that de Klerk
operated within an already established crisis situation, which is conducive to the
emergence of transformational leaders, although not necessarily sufficient for their rise.
Fortuyn, on the other hand, awakened the public to a novel idea and discourse that had
previously not existed in Dutch public life. He created a new conflict-type situation that
challenged people to define ―Dutch identity,‖ which ultimately also meant excluding
those that did not fit into the category.
The third point of comparison is the means by which both leaders inspired and
motivated their followers. Fortuyn was, at the end of the day, a populist. He used rhetoric
defining ―us‖ against ―them,‖ arousing sentiments of Dutch nationalism. His message
fueled the fears of the ―everyday Dutch person‖ against the political elite as well as the
ominous ―Other.‖57
When de Klerk made his speech on that February 2, he knew that he could not expect a
positive response from the entire country. The ANC and their supporters were quick to
claim victory over apartheid while the white far-right was enraged. For de Klerk, his
relationship with the South African public seemed to be an almost entirely uphill battle.
His biggest victory in terms of support was arguably his 1992 referendum, in which the
white population voted in support of continuing negotiations. De Klerk may not have
been the most popular of leaders at the time, but he did prove to be committed to finding
a solution to the country‘s instability. As his political allies point out, riding with the
popular tide was not enough in this case; he had to be one step ahead of his constituency.
An interesting question to investigate here is the source of legitimacy of each of these
leaders. Who, and what institutions, provided them with the legitimacy that they carried
in each of their societies? For Fortuyn, it was undoubtedly the Dutch public that
supported him. Although his party won decisively at the city level in Rotterdam, it had
yet to gain any form of national elected seat in Parliament at the time of his murder. Yet
the reactions to his murder, the resonation of his ideas with Dutch public and political
life, and his party‘s victory in the parliamentary elections are resounding proof of his
place and significance in the modern history of the country.
De Klerk‘s legitimacy was also granted by the people, in that his party was
―democratically‖ elected, but it was only the white populations that partook in this
decision. Legitimacy was not accorded to him by the entire country, however, and even
the support he initially received from the white voters‘ referendum seemed to quickly
wane once the actual process of negotiations had begun. The difference in legitimacy of
de Klerk and Fortuyn is one of the central distinguishing factors between
transformational and charismatic leadership.
A fourth point of comparison between Fortuyn and de Klerk is the legacy they left to
the creation of a multicultural society. De Klerk obviously paved the way on behalf of the
National Party for negotiations to take place. However, after the negotiations, the GNU,
and the TRC, it seems that de Klerk was mostly ignored in the eyes of the people. He had
served his purpose, but now he no longer had much of a place in South African memory.
Mixed reactions to his being awarded the Nobel Prize along with Mandela indicate this
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ambiguous status, but history will probably be kind to de Klerk and remember him most
for his February 2 speech.58
Pim Fortuyn was also central to the transformation of discourse and policy surrounding
multiculturalism. His open and frank criticism of Islam has seemingly been transferred
into mainstream political discourse, and policies such as the creation of examinations for
those seeking Dutch citizenship have reflected this change. The idea of forcing, or at least
strongly urging, immigrants to integrate into Dutch society has become increasingly
accepted.59 Yet by challenging some of the basic assumptions of Dutch political life (for
example, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, protection from verbal or physical
abuse), he opened up a discursive space in which discussion and debate can occur on
sensitive yet important issues.
V.

Lessons

In our increasingly globalized societies, the need to understand leadership in all its forms
and variants is imperative. We have seen how certain leaders are successful in drawing in
followers and fundamentally altering societies. New questions of leadership will no doubt
arise in the future, and the existing ones may become more confusing, as societies
grapple with the fast-paced changes brought about by globalization.
Yet there are a few lessons to be taken from this exercise. First, transformational
leadership is or will soon become necessary for all societies in the face of globalization.
As people seek ways to address the challenges and opportunities brought by this
phenomenon, leaders, too, will have to adapt to the changing times. Transactional
leadership will not prove adequate.
Second, transformational and charismatic leaders interact with their societies
differently. While transformational leaders can garner support around their vision and are
usually instrumental in the attainment of that goal, leaders that are also charismatic
possess the added factor of having the movement linked with them personally. This can
come as either a blessing or a curse. It garners a strong and loyal support base, but it also
makes the leader nearly irreplaceable, as witnessed by the disintegration of the LPF after
Fortuyn‘s death and its entry in Parliament.
An interesting future research topic would be to examine how transformational leaders
operate alongside each other. Looking at the case of South Africa, the transformational de
Klerk was not a charismatic leader, yet he was operating alongside the very charismatic
Nelson Mandela. Judging from this case, the question of whether a transformational
leader can operate successfully without a charismatic leader working together with
him/her could prove revealing.
The third lesson from this research is how, for the multicultural project, leaders can
have progressive or detrimental effects on their societies. De Klerk was central in helping
achieve the current ―miracle‖ that is South African society. The violence was such that at
certain points during the transformation, most observers expected the country to descend
into a race-based civil war. The fact that this did not happen and that the country has now
rebranded itself as ―the Rainbow Nation‖ is a monumental accomplishment. Fortuyn is
often thought of, and thought of himself, as anti-multiculturalism, and was in many ways
detrimental to the goal, mostly by further alienating immigrant populations from Dutch
society. Yet by starting a debate, he began the necessary steps toward the ultimate
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inclusion of minorities in mainstream society. The Netherlands, and Europe generally,
has never had anything akin to the Civil Rights movement of the United States, which
defined modern-day race relations in that country. It seems that something of that stature
is necessary to peacefully negotiate the place of the ever-increasing minority populations
in Europe. Beginning a debate is the only way to achieve it.
The challenges of globalization are many, but with every new challenge comes
opportunity. Leaders in our current age must come to realize this two-sided nature of
globalization, and learn from each other by positive example. Fear of the unknown is a
natural human behavior that we all grapple with at some point in our lives; it is up to our
leaders to take initiative and help calm some of those societal fears. Just as no man is an
island, no leader operates in isolation. The followers play an imperative role in the
relationship. It is a relationship central to the success of healthy, globalized societies and
merits further attention.
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